TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

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TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

Abstract:theprocessofde-collectivizationtookplace25yearsago,howeveritwasuncompleted,whichdeterminedthatchinahastomakegreatefforttocontinuehisruralreform,inordertoliberatethepeasantandthestatusofruralregionasthePartypromised.InChina,thenon-privatizationreformoccurredalongwiththede-collectivizationwasauncompletedreform,whichremainsthedefectsofbothcollectivizationandsmall-scalepeasanteconomy,thereforeitrestrictsthedevelopmentoftheruralsociety,however,thecurrentsystemseemsunablealsoreluctantlytochangeit.Thispaperintentstointroducetheprocessofthecollectivizationandthemostimportantruralreforminthiscentury,namelythede-collectivization,thedemonstratestheprogressionofde-collectivization,itscharactersaswellastheproblemslefttobesolve.
Keywords:collectivizationDe-collectivizationcollectiveownershipincomplete
Foreword
IampleasedthatIamallowedtowritethetermpaperaboutChina.ChinawasinfluencedbyMarxismandwalkedindetourofhistoryforhalfcentury.BeforeMarxismbankruptedinformerSovietUnionandEasternEuropecountries,Chinahadadoptedadifferentwaytoreformfromthosecountries.Becauseofthedifferenceinaspectsofhistoricalevolution,politicalformsandnaturalenvironment,it’shardtocomparetheruralsocietyofChinawiththeseformersocialismcountriesdirectly,also,theprogressionofcollectivizationanditsendaredifferentintwocontinents.
Ruralchinabeforecollectivization
Collectivizationwasamarksystemofthesocialiststate.AlthoughintheeraofUtopiansocialism,RobertOwenforexamplehasalreadyattemptedtosetupthecollectivefarm,butitwasn’tpursuedbyforcestrengthofgovernment.EventhefounderofcommunismMarxdidn’tagreethatcommunismcouldberealizedinundevelopedcountrieswithextremelypoorproductivity.ItwasRussia,theserfcountry,inwhichCommunisttookpowerwithoutadequatepreparation;collectivizationwasimplementedbyforce,inordertoconsolidatetheruleingrass-rootcountryside.ThisexperiencehasinfluencedChinaandEasternEurope,becauseoneofthemeritsofthecollectivizationliesinbeingeasytobemanaged,theotherliesinbeingeasytodeprivepeasants.
Chinawasabackwardcountry,whichsufferedfromignoranceandwarforcenturies.Throughoutthecenturiessome80to90percentoftheChinesepopulationwerefarmersandliveinoneofsome900,000villages,whichhaveanaveragepopulationoffrom1,000to2,000people.Villageswerenotself-contained,self-sufficientunits.Clustersofvillagescenteredonsmallmarkettowns,whichlinkedthemtothewidereconomyandsocietybyprovidingnotonlyopportunitiestobuyandsellbutalsoopportunitiesforentertainment,information,sociallife,andahostofspecializedservices.ThetraditionalChineseelite,oftenreferredtoinEnglishasthegentrydispersedacrossthecountryandoftenlivedinruralareas,wheretheywerethedominantfiguresonthelocalscene,normallyruledvillages.Althoughtheyheldland,whichtheyrentedtotenantfarmers,theyneitherpossessedlargeestateslikeEuropeannoblesnorheldhereditarytitles.However,theytraditionallyinterpretedcentralpoliciesandnationalvaluesforvillagers.Asinfeudalrelationship,thepeasantsandgentrylivedependoneachother.Gentryprovidedlandtopoorpeasantsandtenant,andworkwithrichandmiddlepeasantstosecuretheorderinvillage,forinstanceopeningschoolandbuildingbasicinfrastructurestomaintaintheresocialstatus.InChinesehistory,atthebeginningofverydynasty,thelandrelationshipbetweenlandlordandpoorpeasantswerecomparablyfair,thatmeant,peasanthaveparcelfarmlandtoliveon.Butlandtendedtobeconcentratedonendeverydynasty,thentheremightbeapeasantuprisingledtoanewdynastyandretributionofland.ThisisthebasicclueofsocialevolutioninChinabeforecommunistperiod.
AftertheChineseCommunistPartycameintopowerinmainland,ithadtokeepitspromise,whichitmadeduringtheperiodofwartoencouragethepeasanttojointhearmy,thatitwouldgavepeasanttheirownland.Thefirstmajoractiontookplacefrom1940stoearly1

950s.June1950,anewLandReformLawofnewPeople’sRepublicwaspromulgatedandstipulatednullificationofthefeudallandownershipsystem,andinstitutionalizationofthesystemoflandownershipbypeasants,inwhichthePartysentagentstoeveryvillagetocarryoutthelandreformpolicy.Thisinitselfwasanunprecedentedshowofpoliticalpowerandtheresolutionoftransformanoldsociety.Thereformwassuccessful,becausethepeasantssupportedthepolicy;mostofthemhadbeenwaitingforthereformforlong

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

time.Inthelightofthereformlaw,landwereredistributefromthelandlords,land-owningtrustsorwealthierfamiliestothepoorsegmentsinthesamevillage;villageelites,whomightbeexpectedtogoupagainstthePartyanditsprogramswerebroughtdown;newleadershipwasestablishedbypoorpeasantswhoshowedthemostloyaltytotheparty'sgoals;insteadofkinshipgrouporpatron-clientties,classstatusbecamenewrelationshipamongvillagers.
theprocessofCollectivization
However,theParty’sleaderswerenotsatisfiedwiththeprivatizationofland,atonehand,suchownership,accordingtothedoctrineofsocialism,shouldhavebeenabolishedinthestateofsocialism,atanotherhand,privateownershipofsmallpeasantryhadnofunctionofpropertyaccumulationforthecountry.Atthattime,inordertoacceleratetheconstructionofsocialism,ChinahadlaunchedTheFirstFive-YearPlanaftertheSovietmodel;heavyindustrydevelopmentwasprofoundstressedsincetheleadersofCommunistPartyregardsocialistcountryasacountrywithdevelopedindustrysectors.However,thesituationinearly1950swasnotidealforanewcountry.Pressingofneedsforfoodinacountrywithburgeoningpopulation,domesticcapitalforinvestment,andpurchaseofSoviet-suppliedtechnology,capitalequipment,andmilitaryhardware.Tosatisfytheseneeds,collectivizeagriculturewasputforward.Collectivizationwasregardasamethodtoturncountrysidetostabilebacking,whichcanbemanagedassemi-militaryandhadrarecontactwithoutside,sothatthegovernmentcouldpressthepriceofagriculturalproductsbymeansofscissorsdifferencebetweencitiesandcountryside,andseizehugenumbersofprofitfromagricultureeconomiestosupporttheindustrializationincity.Atthesametime,thegovernmenthadalreadynationalizedbanking,industry,andeventrade.Privateenterprisewasalreadyvirtuallyabolishedinnationalwide.
Despiteinternaldisagreementastothespeedofcollectivization,preliminarycollectivizationwaslaunchedsince1952.China'speasantrysawChairmanMaoandtheCommunistPartyasheroicmuchmorethanRussia'speasantryhadseenStalinandtheBolsheviksasheroes,andthrough1956thepeasantrycooperatedwiththeParty.TherewasnoneoftheresistanceandwarfarethathadaccompaniedthecollectivizationofagricultureintheSovietUnion.
Thecollectivizationofagriculturewasbasicallycompletedwiththeestablishmentofthepeople'scommunesin1958.ThePeople’sCommunesystemwasdefinedasaunityofpoliticsandproduction,inwhichallmembersofthecommunejointlyownedproperty.Essentially,thecommunesystemwasbasedonprivatecontractofitsmembersandtheprincipleofvoluntariesandmutualbenefit,however,itturnedoutyetascoerciveinstitutionalarrangement,whichwasmadebygovernmentwithpoliticalpower.InthemovementtoachievethePeople’sCommune,peasantshadnochoicewhetherornottojoin.
Communesweredesignedaslarge,embracingscoresofvillagescreatedbycombiningsome20or30advancedproducers'cooperativesof20,000to30,000membersonaverage,insomecasesthemembershipvariedfromasfewas6,000toover40,000.Itwasinstitutedasanorganizationwithfunctionsofthelowestleveloflocalgovernmentandthehighestleveloforganizationinagriculturalproduction.Communesconsistedofthreeorganizationallevels:thecentralcommuneadministration;theproductionbrigade,andtheproductionteam,whichgenerallyconsistedofaroundthirtyfamilies.Thiskindofinstitutionwasanorganizationofhierarchies,inwhichthecommuneactedaspoliticalunitandtopmanager,thebrigadesplayedroleofco-coordinatorsbetweenthecommuneandthebasicproductionteams.Theproductionteam

wasbasicunitsofproductionandaccounting.Sincethepeople’scommunesystemwasatoolestablishedtoextractresourcesfromagriculturesectorforindustrialization,asaresult,itneglectedpeasants’incentivecompletely.Inordertoletthepeople’scommunesystemrun,thecentralgovernmentdesignedanrelativeeffectivemechanismtoencouragemanagersineachhierarchytoworkenthusiastically,yet,ineachlevel,themanagersweretreateddifferentlyandtherewasacleardifferenceinaspectsofidentityandwelfarebetweenthemanagersofthecommuneandofthebrigadesorproductionteams.
Thecommunewasdefinedasadministrativeorganandexecutedthecentralgovernment’sorders,andpaidfromcentralgovernment’sbudget,thereforethemanagersinthelevelofcommunewere“statecadres”,thatmeanstheywereformalgovernmentalofficialsandgotwagemonthly.Thesestatecadrescouldbepromotedandbecameofficialsofgovernmentaldivisionsinhigherlevel.Brigadesandproductionteamswerecollectiveeconomicorganizations,theirrunningexpensescamefromproductionteams’tribute

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

.Managersinbrigadeslevelwerecalled“collectivecadres”.Theywereremuneratedintheirownproductionteamsaccordingtotheirlaborquotas.Theirwagewaspaidintheformofproductsinsteadofmoney.Managersinproductionteamswere“teamcadres”,theywerealsomembersoftheproductionteam.Theyworkedaspeasantliketheirworkmates,andwerepaidinproductsaccordingtolaborquotas.Teamcadrescouldbepromotedtocollectivecadres.Collectiveandteamcadreshadlittlepossibilitiestobepromotedandbecamemembersofstatecadres.Nevertheless,ascollectiveandteamcadreshadsomeprivileges.Forexample,collectivemanagershadthepowerofassigningstate’sdeliveryquotasandproductiontasksamongproductionteams,theydeterminedwhocouldenrolledinstate-ownedfactories,universitiesandarmy.Theproductionteammanagersexecutedthepowerofassigningworkanddistributingproductsamongcollectivemembers.Furthermore,intheperiodofmanypoliticalmovementsandclassstruggles,theidentityofcadrecouldprotecttheirfamilies,relativesandthemselvesfrombeingdenouncedandbullied(Tan,1999).
Atbeginning,thecommuneitselfwasdecoratedastherepresentationofsocialistsocietyandhadallmeritsofpublicownership.Althoughnearlyalltheprivatepropertyhadbeendeprived,peasantshadtopraisethenewsystemprofusely.itwastrue,mostpoorpeasantsfoundthattheirliveschanged,byeatinginthepublicdiningtheydidn’tneedtoworryabouttheirownbudgetanymore,andbyworkingtogether,theywerenotnecessarytotrytheirbest.Followingpropagandaappearedinnewspaperseveryday:
Thepublicdininghallsaredistributedinawaythatmembersneedwalkonlyafewminutesfromtheirhomestotaketheirmeals.OnthefreshlywhitewashedwallsoftheoneonShihfuchienStreet,atypicalestablishment,thereisabigsloganinred,whichreads,"HighSpiritsforHigherProduction!"Itskitchen,towhichthevisitorisdrawnbythearomaoffoodandtheclatterofpots,ismanagedbyTuHsiu-chen,thefirstvolunteercook,whohassincelearnedlarge-scalecateringfromthechefatoneofthecity'srestaurants.
Thewallsofthespaciousdiningroomaredecoratedwithpaintings,asahomemightbe.Itstablesandchairs,thoughsimple,arescrubbedtoashiningcleanliness.Thefoodisfreshandtasty--vegetablesaregrownbythecommuneitself.Thestaffmakeaspecialpointofstudyingthedietandpreferencesofoldpeople,children,nursingmothersandmemberswithailments.Thereisaseparateroomforparentswithsmallchildren,providedwithlowtablesforthelittleones.(People’sDaily,1958)
However,inpractice,thisideal,extremelycentralizedformcommunedidn’tkeeprunningwellinmostareas.Verysoonitbecameclearthatinmostcasesthecommunesweretooclumsytocarryoutsuccessfullyallthemanagerialandadministrativefunctionsthatwereassignedtothem.Thecooperativeledtolow-efficiency,theadvantagesoflarge-scaleproductivitydidn’tarriveaspeasantsanticipated,productivitybegantodropanddiscontentemerged.Thereasonliesininsufficientutilizationofresourcesandlackofincentiveofpeasants.Atonehand,theoutpu

tofcooperationcomesfromallmembers’work,inwhichthetributeofsinglehouseholdisdifficulttobemeasured.Sothatopportunismlikeshirkinghappenednaturallyveryfrequently.Aneffectivewaytopreventshirkingistohaveallmemberssupervised,buttheseasonalworkandspatialdiversityofagriculturalproductiveactivitiesmakeitdifficulttototallysupervise.Attheotherhand,althoughbrigadeandproductionteamcadreswereobligedtocompletestate’splanningandallkindsofdeliveries,thecontrolrightandresidualclaimofthepeople’scommunesystemwereinthestate’shand,thesecadresatgrass-levelcouldnotdesignanyreasonableincentivemechanismtoencouragepeasantstoworkhardandproduceaccordingtoreasonablenaturalcondition,suchassoil,irrigationandfarmyear.Thewayleftforbrigadeandteamcadreswastopunishpeasantsbystrugglingagainstthemormaltreatment.Butthebrigadeandteamcadresalsobelongedtomembersofproductionteams,theyandtheirfamilieslivedinthesamecommunitywiththeirsubordinatesaswell,sopunishingpeasantscouldalsomakethemselvesintrouble.Moreover,underthepropertyrightsstructureofthecommunesystem,therestofoutputwasnotbelongtothecommune,brigadeorevenproductionteam,buttothegovernmentsofhigherlevel.Thismadethesupervisors’effortunrelatedtoanyreward.Asaresult,eventhesupervisorhimselfhasnotenoughincentivetoworkandshirkhimselfsometimes.Inaword,undersuchconditionsofpoorsupervision,inwhichalltheworkwasdistributedequallyamongallmembersatthelowestlevel--productionteam,shirkingbecameeverymember’srationalchoiceand

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

furtherweakeningtheefficiencyofthesystem(Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
Topreventpeasantsfromslowdown,shrinkingandescapinginwork,andassurethesystemcouldkeeponmoving,thepartycollectedallproductiveequipmentsandforbidmembersinpeople’scommuneengaginginprivateproductionandbusinessontheonehand,andatsametimedeprivedpeasants’rightofmigratingfromcountrysidetocityorbetweendistrictsbymeansofhouseholdregistrationontheotherhand.Nevertheless,suchpolicieshadnoeffectonimprovingincentiveofpeasants,buttheyformedatleastpoliticalpressonverymemberofpeople’scommune,becauseitturnedoutthateveryone’sonlyroutineistostayinthecommuneandfinishone’stask.Withouttherighttoleaveorgetbetterthanothers,peasantscommonlychosetoworkwithlittleeffort,e.g.apassivemethod,toevadeproductiontasksassignedbyleader.Littleaccumulationandshirkingmadecountrysidewidelyfallintopoverty,rareruralregionhadgoodconditionstodevelopindustryortoimprovecommerce,infrastructureswentworse,productivitysankquickly.Themostseriouscrisisforagriculturalcollectivizationhappenedbetween1959and1961.GNPdecreasedfrom213.8billionYuanin1958to180.0billionYuanin1962,withanaverageannualreductionof15.1%ingrossindustrialproductionvalueandanaverageannualreductionof19.3%ingrossagriculturalproductionvaluefrom1958to1960.Owingtotheseriousshortageoffood,agreatfaminetookplaceinthewholecountryandatleast30millionresidentsdied(Tan,2000).Discontentwithsuchsystembrokeout,insomeareas,peasantsdidn’twanttoreliedsoheavilyonordersfromaboveandmadesolittleallowanceforlocalconditionsorlocalinitiative.TheseverecrisisforcedthePartytoadjusttheirpolicies.From1961on,communefunctionswerereducedtoadministrationandco-ordination,productionteamwasconfirmedasthebasicunitofaccounting,certainproductiondecisionmakingwasdelegatedtoproductionteams,whichwereallowedtoretainsomeincometoovercomeproblemsofegalitarianism;householdsagainallowedtohavesmallprivateplotsandsidelinesforplantingvegetables,andalimitedopeningmarketsfortransactionbetweenurbanandruralareas.However,theseadjustmentsdidn’tmeantochangethesystemofpeople’scommune,butonlytopreventpeasantsfromrebel.From1966to1976ChinasufferedthedisasterofCulturalRevolution,therewerelargeinstitutionalswingstookplaceinthisperiod,inwhichco-operativemovedfromsmalltolargeandfromteamtobrigadetocommuneagain,localfre

emarkets,sidelinesandprivateplotswasprohibitedagain,andpoliticalfactorshadagreatinfluenceonproductiondecisions.
Inlate1970s,aftertheLeaderChairmanMaopassedaway,therequirementforimprovingagriculturalproductivitycamealive.Administratorsinprovincial-levelunitswithextensiveregionsoflowyieldsandconsequentlowstandardsoflivingbeganexperimentingwithnewformsoftenureandproduction.Toavoidfrontalconflictsofwidescopewithgovernment’spoliciesandthemainideology,agradualapproachwasadopted.Thefirststepofreformwastodividetheproductionteamintogroupsandtofixyieldquotasforeachgroup.Eachgroupsignedacontractwithproductionteam,thecontractualitemsincludedtheconditionsofusingland,laborers,farmtoolsanddraftanimals,theexpenditure,laborcontribution,rewardsforexcessivelaborcontributionandsoon.Aftercompletingthetasksassignedbytheproductionteam,theoutputcouldbedistributedamongworkgroupsaccordingtotheirlaborquotas.Andthen,thefurthersolutionwasputforward,namelythetypicalformoffixingquotascalled“all-roundcontract”,whichwasinitiatedbyafewbravepeasantsecretlyinFengyangcountyofAnhuiprovince.thiscontractregulated,householdwasallowedtocultivatedacertainparcelfarmlandinthegroup,ifgrainquotasassignedbythestateandthecollectiveaccumulationwereaccomplished,thehouseholdcouldownalltheresidualoutput.Inthelightofthecontract,peasantsweregivendirectlystimulationtoproduce.Theexperimentwasdeemedsuccessfulandpopular,anditsoonspreadtoalldistricts.
Atanotherside,politicalsituationwasappropriatewiththereformformbelow.IntheEleventhNationalPartyCongress,heldAugust12-18,1977proclaimedtheformalendoftheCulturalRevolution,blameditentirelyontheGangofFour,andreiteratedthat"thefundamentaltaskofthepartyinthenewhistoricalperiodistobuildChinaintoamodern,powerfulsocialistcountrybytheendofthetwentiethcentury."ThereformerDengXiaopingwaselectedasvicechairmanandbacktopoliticalstageandsuggestedaseriesofreformplans,thoughmanycontradictionsstillwereapparent,changeofpolicywasregarde

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

dasnecessary.RehabilitationsofDeng'sassociatesandotherssympathetictothesereformplansweresteppedup.NotonlyweresomeofthosepurgedduringtheCulturalRevolutionreturnedtopower,butalsoindividualswhohadfallenfromfavorasearlyasthemid-1950swererehabilitated.Itwasatimeofincreasedpoliticalactivism.
InNovember1980,theCentralCommitteeofCommunistPartyofChinaissuedthedocumentSomeIssuesofFurtherReinforcingandImprovingtheResponsibilitySysteminAgriculturalProduction.ThisjafsmanifestthefirsttimethatthePartyacceptedtheproductionresponsibilitysystemsdevelopinginpractice.Inthedocumentfixedoutputquotasoffarmlandforeachgroupandresponsibilitycontractsinsomespecializedobligationswereindicated,atthesametime,thefixedoutputquotasforhouseholdwasalsoregardedaspositive.Undertheencouragementofgovernment’spolicyandrelatedsupportmeasures,plentyofproductionresponsibilitysystemsdevelopedveryrapidlyinruralareas.In1981,awidedeeperreformcalledfixingthecontributequoteforeachhousehold(baogandaohu),whichwasmuchmoreradical,wasimplemented.Inaccordancetothesystem,allcollectivelandsinproductionteamsweretobedistributedamonghouseholdsbasedontheirpopulationorlaborers.Thehouseholdscouldmanagethelands,madeproductiondecisionsbythemselves,andboretheresults.Whentasksassignedbyuppergovernmentandthecollectiveaccumulation,e.g.acertainquantityofgrainandlivestock,werecompleted,theremainedproductscouldbeownedbythehouseholdsandnotdistributedamongmembersintheproductionteam.Moreover,ifthehouseholdmadesurethattheyhaveenoughration,theyhadrighttoselltheleftgraintostateownedagriculturalenterprisesorconsumethemastheywant,usuallyfeedinglivestockormakingwineforexample.ThatmeantthemodelfromFengyangwasfinallyadmittedbyParty.InOctober1983,thePartyandtheStateCounselissuedthedocumentNoticeofSeparatingtheCo-operativefromPoliticsan

dSettingUptheTownshipGovernmentandrequiredthecooperativetoseparatefromlocalgovernment.Theactorderedthatthepeople'scommuneswerereplacedbyadministrativetownships.Bytheendof1984,98%ofproductionteamshadtakenthereformofHouseholdResponsibilitySystem.Itwasuntilthen,thecollectivizationsystemwasdismantledcompletely.
SomeCharactersofDe-collectivizationandProblemsleft
Norestitution
Yet,de-collectivizationandtheimplementofthehouseholdresponsibilitysystemisneitherareformoftheownershipoflandnoraprocessofprivatization.Aswehavementionedabove,aftertheCommunistPartysetupitsowngovernmentin1949,itstartedlandreformanddistributedlandstothepoorfromlandlordsandrichpeasants.Peasantacquiredparcelsoflandaccordingtothelaborforces,thenlandwereregisteredundernameofeachhousehold.Beforetheeveofcollectivization,mostoflandsinruralChinawerelegallyprivatelyowned.Butwhende-collectivizationbegan,peasantsdidnotgetbacktheirformerlandsagain.Thehouseholdresponsibilitysystemonlydistributetherightofmanageandbenefitoflandsamonghouseholdsaccordingtotheirpopulationorlaborers.So,thede-collectivizationinChinadidnotlikethatinmostofEastEuropeancountriessuchasBulgaria,Czech,Hungary,Poland,RomaniaandSlovakia,butlikethatinAlbania.Thatistosay,therewasnorestitutionofland.However,informerEastEuropeanCountries,whetherrestitutionwasimplementedornot,thede-collectivizationhadsymbiosiswithprivatization.InChina,althoughduringtheprocessofde-collectivizationtherewereinrealitysomeopinionsthatlandsshouldberestituted,suchvoiceswerenotaccepted,norevendiscussed.
Thereasonswhyrestitutionoflandinthede-collectivizationofruralChinadidnothappenmaylieinsomehistoricreasons.Firstofall,althoughpeasantsinChinahadprivateownershipoverlandsbeforethecollectivization,largepercentofpeasantsownedfarmlandsthatdidnotbelongtothembefore,theyobtainthemfrompoliticaltransformation.Theoretically,violencecan’tconsistthelegalreasonoftransferofownershipoverrealestate,thereforeevenaftertheterrorizeduringthelandreformatbeginningof1950s,theprivateownershipoflands,whichwasmadeoutbythecommunistgovernment,hadnotyetbecamestableandcommonlyaccepted.However,theformerlandlordclasshadrootedoffduringthepoliticalmovement,landcontactsandregisterbooksoflandtitlehadbeendestroyed,noonedaretochallengethepowerofCommunistPartyanymore.Sincethecollectivizationbegansoonafterthelandreform,thenewestablishedownerrelationshipwasbrokenagain,whende-collectivizationcameabout,withoutsupportsfromthecentralgovernment,mostofpeasan

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

tsonlytookthehouseholdresponsibilitysystemasanotherchanceofequallydistributinglands,justlikethelandreformin1949.Astodescendantsofformerlandlordclass,theymighthavenotforgottentheexperienceoftheirpoorancestors’:claimingprivaterightbeforethePartywhichregardingpublicownershipasuniversaltruthisadangerousdeal.
Secondly,differentfrommostcountryinformercommunisteastEuropeancountries,inwhichfarmers’nominalownershipoflandswasremained,eventhoughtheirlandswererequisitionedincollectivefarmswithoutanypayment,andsothatitwaseasyforpeasantsinthesecountriestotakebackthelandwhenthecollectivefarmswentover.Onthecontrary,inChina,privateownershipoflandwastotallyabolishedassoonasthepeople’scommunesystemwassetup,after20years,thecollectiveownershiphadalreadyfestbasis.Asaresult,thetransactioncostsofrestitutionsohighastowipeitout.Thatmeans,evenapeasantwanttotakebacktheformerfarmlandwhichbelongedtothem,it’sveryhardtohimtocollecttherelevantevidencestosupporthisclaim,moreover,therewasnolegaljusticeprocesstosupportsuchapplication.SonormalfarmerwouldrathertoaccepttheHouseholdResponsibilitySystem.
Finally,thekeyreasonliesinthesocialismsystemitself.EventhoughtheCommunistPartyofhadpoorperformanceinleadingthecountryanditspeopletowealthandhappinessduringsocialistrevolution,Chinesepeopleha

vetakensocialismasthecharacteristicofthecountryforgrant,afteralltheslogan“SocialismsavedChina”hasbeendeeplyimpressed.SothatevenaftertheCultureRevolution,mostpeoplestillproppeduptheParty.ThePartyledtheruralreformanddecidedthede-collectivization.However,thereformisa“liberationoftheruralproductivity”,whichsuittherequirementoftheParty.BecausetheChineseCommunistPartyinsistedthathismissionistorealizesocialism,andsocialismisbasedonpublicownershipsystem.Collectiveownershipwasdeemedasoneformofpublicownershipinruralregions,sothatasChinakeptontheroadofrealizingsocialism,“landinruralareasbelongtocollective”wascertainlyremainedafterruralreform,andregulatedintheConstitutionof1982,whichisvalidtillnow.
Atthetimeofde-collectivization,thedissolutionofpeople’scommuneandthewideimplementofresponsibilitysystemwereregardasagreatinnovation.Accordingtothestatistic,TheHouseholdResponsibilitySystemdidbringaboutamoreprosperousagricultureinChina.From1978to1984,grainoutputinChinaincreasedatanannualaveragerateof5%andthegrossvalueofagricultureby7.7%(Lin,1997).IncontrastwithformerEuropeancountries,thede-collectivizationseemsbringmorebenefittoChinesepeasantsatbeginning.Sothatatthattime,rarepeasantdidrealizethatsuchareformwithouttransformationofownershipwasincompletely.However,Thenaturalshortcomingsofthede-collectivizationwouldsurelybringaseriesofproblems.
institutionalproblem:landdistribution
Asweshowedabove,thede-collectivizationransmoothlyandtheintroductionofHouseholdResponsibilitySystemhasgotagreatsuccess,althoughitcouldnotaddresseverythingasonlyaninstitutionalinnovation.Afterseveralyearsofpractice,ithasbeenalreadyprovedthatthereareanumberofweaknessesandlimitationsremainedfromtheincompletelyde-collectivization.Onehastoconfirm,thatthecollectiveownershipandcontractsystemledtotheinequityinbotheconomicandpoliticalfeatures.
Ineconomicview,duringthede-collectivization,farmlandwasdistributedtoindividualhouseholdsinformoffragmentedfarmingunits.Theprincipleoflanddistributionwasderiveddirectlyfromcollectiveownership.Farmlandinavillagewasownedbyallofitsmemberscollectively.Asaresult,everymemberhadequalrighttoclaimondistributionofthelandaccordingtocertainnorm,whichwasbasedprimarilyonthesizeofthepeasantfamily.InrealityofChinawithabundantpopulationandlimitedland,theamountcanbedistributedtoeachhouseholdwasverysmall.Moreover,landdifferedfromeachotherintermsofsoilfertility,irrigationconditions,locationandsoon.Inmanycases,ahouseholdhadtoobtainpiecesoflandfromeachofthegrades.asaresult,thesumwasnotonlyinsufficientbutalsodisjointedandscatteredaroundvillages.Largeareasofcultivatedlandwerewastedintheformofpathsandboundariesseparatinghouseholds'contractfield.AsurveyconductedbytheChineseMinistryofAgricultureindicatedthatin1986,among7983samplevillagesfrom29provinces,averagecultivatedareaperhouseholdwas0.466ha(7mu)fragmentedinto5.85plots,eachplotonaverage0.08ha(1.2mu)(MinistryofAgricultureofChina,1993).Thisfragmentedstructureoffami

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

lyfarminghasremainedlargelyuntouchedafterimplementofcontractsystemandhasdetainedthepossibilitiesofusingrelativelyadvancedmechanicalagriculturalequipmentandinfrastructures.
Undersuchsystem,farmersturnedtobeshort-terminaction.Accordingtothedistributeruleoflandinhouseholdresponsibilitysystem,landistodistributedependedonlyonvillagerstatus,babiesandvillagers'new-comersuchasnewlymarriedbridefromothervillageswerealleligibleclaimants,whichhavingequalrightstoshareequalamountsoflandinthisvillage;onthecontrary,whenavillagerleftordied,therightoflandclaimwouldautomaticallywithdraw.Aspopulationincreased,villageshadtoreadjustthedistributionstructure,whichfurthersubdividedthefarmland.Theendlessredistributionoffarmlandresultedinmanyproblems,including:1)thesituationofasmallandfragmentedfarmingstructur

efurtherdeteriorated;2)worryingabouttheriskoflosingtheirlandaswellasinvestment,farmershadlittleincentivestoimprovelandconservationandagriculturalinfrastructure-irrigatedland,oneofthemostsignificantcomponentsofagriculturalinfrastructureinChina,remainedalmostunchangedduringthe1980s;3)farmersover-exploitedthesoiltopursueshort-termprofits;4)thecourseoflandredistributionwasalsocostly,itrequiredlaborandtimeinorganizationandexecution.(Chen,1999)
Anotherproblemisthatfarmlandwasgenerallybadlyendowedwiththeappropriatehumancapital.Sinceegalitarianismwasthegeneralleadingprinciplerule,whichgavelittleconsiderationtointerfamilydifferencessuchaslaborcapability,educationandindividualpreference.Asaresult,somelargehouseholdswithaincompletelaborforcecouldhavecomparablymuchmorelandtocultivate,meanwhileothersmallerhouseholds,aboveallthosespecializedinagriculture,couldhaveonlyinadequatelandforfullemployment.Suchkindofproblemwasmuchworseinruralareasexperiencingrapidtownshiporvillageindustryandurbanization.Inthoseregiontherewasoftendeteriorationintheagriculturallaborforcesincemostofcapablelaborstendednottoworkathomeasafarmer.Thereweremanywhodidnotgiveprioritytocultivationandattimesevenletthelandlieunused.Consequently,thefarmlandwasunderutilized.
Uponprecedinganalyzing,wecanseethat,inordertopursueegalitarianismonsurfaceindistributionofland,intheprocessofthede-collectivizationsacrificedeconomicefficiency.Thus,ifthelandwasprivate,thenthosedifferencearousefromdistributionwilldeceaseafterenoughtime,becausethefreemarketwillleadtoequalefficiencythroughthechooseofmarket.However,suchpoliticalbackgroundlackedfrombeginningon,sothattheshortcomingofanon-privatizationde-collectivizationcan’tbecorrectedorevenbeenlargedbecauseofproblemofpoliticalsystem.
Oneofthemainreasonispoliticalstructureoverthecollectiveownership.Firstatgrass-rootlevel,itwasusuallythevillagehead,whotakesthepowertodecidedistributionsincedecentralization.Sothatthecadrefamilyortheirrelationswillsurelybenefitfromthedistribution.Havingacadreinthefamilyseemstobeacertainprerogativeinusingtheirpoliticalstatustoaccumulatewealth.Atonehand,Villagecadresmayallocatemorefertilepartsofthevillagelandtothemselvesanddeterminedmorefavorablegrainsalesquotasforthemselves.Andalso,cadreshavemoreopportunitytobuildpersonalrelationshipwithhigherlevelandotherimportantdepartments,ruralcreditbanksortransportationcompaniesforexample,sothattheyhavemorechancetoobtainmaterialbenefitthannormalpeasants.Aswesee,mostofcollectiveenterprisesandprivateeconomiesinruralareashavetightrelationshipwithlocalgovernments,atthebasiclevel,withvillagercadres,mostruralenterprisersarevillagerleaderthemselves.Furthermore,cadresandtheirrelationsgenerallytendtobreakthepolicyofbirthcontrol,becausetheyarecapabletosupportmorefamilymembers,andtheirkinwillstrengthentheireconomicandpoliticalpowerinreturn.
Atanotherhand,thoughaccordingtotheelectionregulationofruralcadreinchina,thesevillagecadreshouldbeelecteddirectlybyvillagers,whohavecommoninterestinthecommunity,thisrulehasbeenalmostneverputintopractice.UnderonePartysystemandpublicownershipsystem,allimportantresourcesaregatheredintheParty’shand,asaresult,insteadofelection,theopinionfromhigherlevelplaysasignificantrole,inordertocarryortthepolicyofPartyefficiently.Infact,twofactorsdeterminethecandidatesinappointmentofvillagehead,oneistherelationshipwithofficialofhigherlevel,andtheotheriskinship.Consequently,cadrefamilytakesalladvantagestomaintaintheirpowera

TheCollectivizationaandDe-collectivizationinRuralChina

ndstatusthroughsuchappointment.So,cadresinruralChinadon’trepresentthebenefitoftheirvillagemembers,butthepowerofthePartyaswellasthefamily,thereisnopossibilityforpeasantstoclaimequalityorsavetheirfromsufferingasapeasant.
Inaword,afterashortflourishinruralChina,whichcamealongwiththed

e-collectivizationandtheimplementofHouseholdResponsibilitySystem,mostpeasantshavetofacetheirrationaloccupationanddistributionsystemoffarmlandandthepoliticalsystem,whichisimpossibletochange.Besidestherewasstrictlimitationpreventpeasantsfromabandoningtheirresponsiblelandandrushingintocities,sothatthepeasantsfounditishardtochangetheirsituationorturnitmorebetterandfree.Thismayexplainwhyinruralchinaexistsalwaysthetendencyofoverpopulationbuttheincomeofhouseholdbegantodecreaseonlyafterlessthan10yearsfromthede-collectivization.Asaresult,landreforminChinahasemergedasadifficultissueinruralareasofexchangebetweensocialequalityandeconomicefficiency.Itseemsobviousthatsincethemid-1980sthewideruralsocietyhasbeencaughtinthispredicament:wheresocialequalityorequityworsened,andatsametimeeconomicefficiencyheldback..Accordingtostatistics,averagenetincomeincountrysidehasbeensloweddownforyears.In2000,thehouseholdaverageincomeonlyreached272dollars,buttheGinicoefficientinChinabaseinurbanandruralareasrosefrom0.21in1978tomorethan0.46.
briefconclusion
Lookingcloselyattheinstitution,animportantlessonmightbelearned.Currently,thegoalsofequalityorequityarestilloutstandinglyimportant.Thus,aneffectivereformstrategyinChinainthecurrentenvironmentmustsatisfythesenormandthenseekefficiencyincrementally.Otherwise,itisunlikelythatanyreformapproachorprocesscansucceed.Theclarificationoflandasoneofsignificantpropertyrightshasconfirmedtobestillatanearlystage.Sofarfarmershaveonlyinsufficientpropertyrights,orwecansaythatpeasants'propertyrightsbasedoflandisstillunstable,itiscorrodedbythecurrentsystemitself.What’smore,peasantscannotgetcompensationfortheircontributioneveniftheychoosetoleaveornolongeractiveintheirvillage.Peasantssufferfrominevitablelowefficiencybuttheyfindnowaytochangethereality.Atsametime,surplusagriculturallaborcontinuestogrowinvillages,slowingdowntheprogressofruralindustrializationandurbanization,whicharestilltheaimofChinesereform.
Sincetheinadequacyofpropertyrightsencumberstheruralreformprocess,furtherclarificationoflandrightswillundoubtedlybeakeyissue.Althoughthisquestionisstillverycontroversialanddisputed,iftherewillbenoessentialchange,itislikelythattheruraldevelopmentprocessinChinawillcontinuetobefrustratedandmightresultinanewroundcrisisinruralChina.
Reference:
1,Lin,J.Y.InstitutionalreformsanddynamicsofagriculturalgrowthinChina.XinhuaPress.1997
2,Reisch,E.LandreformpolicyinChina:PoliticalguidelinesCenterforAgriculturalPublishing,Wageningen,Netherlands.1992
3,Lin,J.CollectivizationandChina’sAgriculturalCrisisin1959-1961,JournalofPoliticalEconomy,No.98.1990
4,Tan,Q.TheOriginofCollectiveTownshipandVillageEnterprisesinChina,ChineseEconomicHistory,Vol.2.1999
5,Zhou,Q,RuralReforminChina:TheChangeofRelationshipbetweentheStateandOwnership,ChineseSocialSciencesQuarterly,Vol.8.1994
6,Chen,K.,G.JeffersonLessonsfromChina’sEconomicReform,JournalofComparativeEconomics,Vol.16,1992
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